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One of the issues on which the report of the Appellate Body in EC – Seal Products2 has 
stirred considerable debate among legal academics is how to deal with product regulations 
allegedly furthering multiple policy purposes under the law of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).3 The measure at issue in that case was a sales ban imposed by the 
European Union (EU) on seal and seal-containing products, coupled with a number of 
exceptions including for seal products derived from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit 
or other indigenous communities (IC exception). The ban was imposed out of European 
‘public moral’ concerns over the cruel manner in which seals are hunted and killed, whereas 
the exception was made to protect Inuit cultural identity and livelihood. The key question 
that arose was whether this difference in regulatory treatment, which was found to cause 
detrimental impact (i.e., an asymmetric or disparate effect) 4  on the conditions of 
competition for seals products imported from Canada and Norway (few of which were 
eligible to enter the EU market under the IC exception) vis-à-vis seal products imported 
from Greenland (the majority of which were eligible to enter the EU market under the IC 
exception), was nonetheless justifiable under WTO law. For the most part, academic 
discussions have focused on the Appellate Body’s analysis of this issue under the chapeau 
of Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),5 since it did not 
address parallel claims made under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)6 
having (quite rightly) reversed the Panel’s finding that the EU seal regime qualified as a 
technical regulation.7 And yet, as will be seen, it is plausible that in other cases a product 
regulation with multiple policy purposes comes within the scope of application of both 
agreements. With this in mind, this article seeks to contribute to the debate triggered by EC 
                                                        
1  Lecturer in International Economic Law, University of Edinburgh School of Law (Gracia.Marin-
Duran@ed.ac.uk). This research was conducted during a Visiting Fellowship at the Graduate Institute of 
International and Development Studies (Geneva), which the author gratefully acknowledges. An earlier 
version of this paper was presented at the 15th Annual WTO Conference (London, 6-7 May 2015). I am 
deeply grateful to Lorand Bartels, James Flett, Joost Pauwelyn and Donald Regan for their most valuable 
comments on previous drafts and insightful exchanges on the topic. Opinions and errors remain my own.  
2 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/DS401/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014.  
3 See notably, Donald H. Regan, ‘Measures with Multiple Purposes: Puzzles from EC—Seal Products’ AJIL 
Unbound (25 June 2015); Julia Y. Qin, ‘Accommodating Divergent Policy Objectives under WTO Law: 
Reflections on EC—Seal Products’ AJIL Unbound (25 June 2015), http://www.asil.org/blogs/ajil-
unbound?page=1&blog=83.  
4 On this notion of ‘detrimental impact’, see Lothar Ehring, ‘De Facto Discrimination in World Trade Law: 
National and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment – or Equal Treatment?’ (2002) 36(5) Journal of World Trade 
921. 
5 World Trade Organization, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations – The Legal Texts 
(Cambridge University Press, 1999), 423.  
6 Ibid, 121.  
7 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, paras 5.59-5.69. For further discussion, see Gracia 
Marín Durán, ‘Non-Tariff Barriers and the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade: the Case of 
PPM-based Measures after US – Tuna II and EC – Seal Products' (2015) 6 European Yearbook of International 
Economic Law 87, at 99-101.  
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– Seal Products by taking a more systemic perspective and considering also how this type of 
measure would be appraised under Article 2.1 TBT Agreement. 
The relationship between the overlapping non-discrimination disciplines of the 
GATT (Articles I and III) and the TBT Agreement (Article 2.1) is, however, far from 
settled following the Appellate Body’s report in EC – Seal Products. On the one hand, the 
Appellate Body reiterated that the two agreements ‘should be interpreted in a coherent and 
consistent manner’, given that the balance between international trade liberalisation and 
domestic regulatory autonomy under the TBT Agreement ‘is not, in principle, different 
from the balance set out in the GATT’.8 On the other hand, it also held that the principle 
of coherent and consistent interpretation does not mean that ‘the legal standards for similar 
obligations –such as Articles I:1 and III:4 [GATT], on the one hand, and Article 2.1 [TBT 
Agreement], on the other hand– must be given identical meanings.’9  
Taking this stance, the Appellate Body made clear where the balance between WTO 
non-discrimination obligations and members’ right to regulate ought to be struck in each 
agreement. In essence, under the GATT, a determination of whether there is detrimental 
impact on (or between) imports is made under Articles I/III and of whether it can be 
justified under Article XX, whereas under the TBT Agreement both questions are 
addressed within Article 2.1 itself. 10  While structural differences between the two 
agreements can arguably explain this interpretative approach,11 what is far less clear is why 
the Appellate Body also considered that the legal standards for justifying detrimental 
impact or discrimination (here used interchangeably) –i.e., the ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination’ test under the chapeau of Article XX GATT and the ‘legitimate regulatory 
distinction’ (LRD) test of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement– are not the same.12 This is certainly 
puzzling particularly when, as in the EC – Seal Products case, the enquiries under these 
justification provisions overlap and have essentially the same function: that is, to determine 
whether the different regulatory treatment (i.e., prohibition/exception) having detrimental 
effects on imports can or cannot be justified.13 So why are the applicable legal tests all of a 
sudden different? And don’t we risk ending with inconsistent outcomes, rather than 
preserving the same balance, under both agreements?  
On this background, the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 begins by outlining 
what is here understood by measures accommodating multiple competing purposes and why 
                                                        
8 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, paras 5.121-5.122.  
9 Ibid, para 5.123 (emphasis in original). 
10 Ibid, paras 5.71-5.130, where it essentially rejects the EU’s claim that the legal standards under Articles 
I/III GATT should include, in line with the analysis under Article 2.1 TBT Agreement, an enquiry into 
whether detrimental impact on imports ‘stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction’, given the 
existence of Article XX GATT. On these structural differences between the GATT and the TBT Agreement, 
see Gabrielle Marceau and Joel P. Trachtman, ‘A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic 
Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (2014) 48(2) Journal of World Trade 351, at 363-
366 and 378-380.  
11 This is not the place to engage with the long-standing debate on the role of regulatory purpose under 
Articles I/III GATT, see generally: James Flett, ‘WTO Space for National Regulation: Requiem for a 
Diagonal Vector Test’ (2013) 16(1) Journal of International Economic Law 37; Donald H. Regan, ‘Further 
Thoughts on the Role of Regulatory Purpose under Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade: A Tribute to Bob Hudec’ (2003) 37(4) Journal of World Trade 737; Weihuan Zhou, ‘US – Clove Cigarettes 
and US – Tuna II (Mexico): Implications for the Role of Regulatory Purpose under Article III:4 of the GATT’ 
(2012) 15(4)  Journal of International Economic Law 1075. 
12 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, paras 5.310-5.313, where it makes abstract statements 
on the ‘important parallels’ between the analyses under Article 2.1 TBT Agreement and the chapeau of 
Article XX GATT, but also the ‘significant differences’ in terms of their function, scope and applicable legal 
standards.  
13 Ibid, paras 5.136 and 5.138, where it recognizes that the cause of the ‘discrimination’ considered under the 
chapeau of Article XX GATT was actually the same as that of ‘detrimental impact’ under Article I GATT.  
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they may necessitate justification under the chapeau of Article XX GATT or/and the LRD 
prong of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement. Section 3 exposes the difficulty in justifying such 
measures under the chapeau of Article XX GATT, which is mostly due to the rigidity of 
the rational connection standard for assessing unjustifiable discrimination that was first 
introduced by the Appellate Body in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres. 14  It then criticizes the 
Appellate Body’s ambivalent stance on this rational connection standard in EC – Seal 
Products, and argues that it should have clearly recognized that discrimination under the 
chapeau can be justified by a legitimate regulatory purpose, even if it is independent from, or 
goes against, the main objective of the measure. Section 4 turns to the LRD prong of 
Article 2.1 TBT Agreement, which was similarly coined by the Appellate Body in US – 
Clove Cigarettes.15 It will be shown that this justification test offers a more flexible approach 
for appraising measures with multiple competing purposes, mainly because it does not 
embody an equally strict rational connection standard. Section 5 argues that, contrary to the 
Appellate Body’s puzzling statements in EC – Seal Products, the legal standards for justifying 
discrimination under GATT Article XX-chapeau and Article 2.1 TBT Agreement should 
be essentially the same, and thus conflicting interpretations avoided. It is cautioned that, if 
the Appellate Body instead maintains a different approach to rational connection under 
each of these justification provisions, we could end up with the absurd result that the exact 
same discriminatory treatment of a measure with multiple competing purposes is found to 
be TBT-justified, and yet GATT-unjustified. Section 6 concludes by suggesting a two-tier test 
for bringing in line the justification provisions under the GATT and TBT Agreement.  
 
II. MEASURES WITH MULTIPLE POLICY PURPOSES – WHY AN ISSUE 
UNDER WTO LAW? 
 
It is widely accepted, 16 including by the Appellate Body,17 that domestic regulators may 
take into account, and accommodate within a single measure, several policy interests. That 
being so, what was then the issue with multiple-purposes regulation in EC – Seal Products? 
As noted earlier, the dispute concerned a ban on the placing on the EU market of seal and 
seal-containing products so as to address European public moral concerns on the welfare 
of seals (for simplicity, seal welfare purpose), while a number of exceptions were made for, 
amongst others, seal products derived from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit or other 
indigenous communities that contribute to their subsistence (for simplicity, Inuit 
protection purpose).18 However, the two regulatory purposes appear to go against each 
other, given that ‘IC hunts can cause the very pain and suffering for seals that the EU 
                                                        
14 WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil – Retreaded Tyres), 
WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007.  
15 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US – 
Clove Cigarettes), WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012. 
16 See e.g., Lorand Bartels, ‘The Chapeau of Article XX GATT: A New Interpretation’ (2014) Cambridge Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series No 40/2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2469852; 
Philip I. Levy and Donald H. Regan, ‘EC – Seal Products: Seals and Sensibilities (TBT Aspects of the Panel 
and Appellate Body Reports)’ (2015) 14(2) World Trade Review 337, at 363. 
17Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, above n 15, paras 113 and 115. 
18 Council and European Parliament Regulation (EC) 1007/2009, OJ 2009 L286/36, Article 3(1). Note that 
the Regulation (Article 3(2)) contained another two explicit exceptions from the general ban for: (i) products 
obtained from seals hunted for the sole purpose of marine resource management and not placed on the 
market for commercial reasons (MRM exception); and (ii) seal products brought by travellers into the EU on 
an occasional basis and exclusively for their personal use (Travellers exception). However, these are not 
considered in this article as only the IC exception was at issue in the assessment of unjustifiable 
discrimination under the chapeau of Article XX GATT: see Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above 
n 2, para 5.316. 
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public is concerned about.’19 The proper way of characterizing the objective(s) of the EU 
seal regime proved itself controversial, with Norway claiming that it pursued ‘independent 
policy objectives’, while the EU arguing that it reflected instead a single ‘moral standard of 
animal welfarism’ pursuant to which the protection of Inuit cultural identity and 
subsistence could be deemed morally superior to the welfare of seals under certain 
conditions.20 For its part, the Appellate Body found that the ‘principal objective of the EU 
Seal Regime is to address EU public moral concerns regarding seal welfare, while 
accommodating IC and other interests so as to mitigate the impact of the measure on those 
interests.’21 Arguably, this characterization appears reasonable given that it was the public 
moral concerns on seal welfare that primarily called the whole EU seal regime into 
existence: there would have been no reason to have an exception protecting Inuit interests 
if there were not a prior reason (i.e., protecting seal welfare) to ban seal products. 22 
However, in trying to discern the ‘principal’ or ‘main’ objective of the EU seal regime, the 
Appellate Body’s approach implicates that the rationale underlying an exception to a trade-
restrictive rule is unlikely to be considered an ‘objective’ of the measure from a WTO law 
standpoint. To reflect this, the term multiple competing purposes (rather than ‘objectives’) 
will be used in this article to refer to measures that restrict trade for one policy purpose, 
but do not apply to certain ‘like products’ in order to accommodate another purpose.    
 In this way, the contested measure in EC – Seal Products can be distinguished from 
that at issue in the US – Tuna II case, which established the conditions for the use of a 
‘dolphin-safe’ label on tuna products sold on the US market and was held to pursue two 
objectives: consumer information and dolphin protection.23 Such multiple objectives may 
be termed as consistent since, from a regulatory perspective, there is no need to make any 
trade-off as nothing prevents both objectives from being advanced in a mutually 
supportive manner –i.e., better protection of dolphins can go hand in hand with better 
consumer information. Conversely, in EC – Seal Products, a trade-off between protecting 
seal welfare and preserving Inuit cultural identity and livelihood appeared necessary, at least 
insofar as seal hunting, involving inhumane methods, is considered an indispensable 
element of Inuit tradition and subsistence.24 This last condition, in turn, highlights one of 
the difficulties when dealing with measures purported to serve competing policy purposes: 
how do we ascertain that these are genuinely competing and a trade-off in the form of 
rule/exception is truly needed from a regulatory perspective? 
In addition, measures accommodating competing policy purposes through a 
rule/exception are likely to be regarded with some suspicion under WTO law as being 
potentially in tension with the core non-discrimination disciplines: namely, the most-
favoured-nation (MFN) treatment obligation under Article I GATT and national treatment 
obligation under Article III GATT, as well as the parallel obligations under Article 2.1 TBT 
Agreement excluding the LRD limb.25 As most recently interpreted by the Appellate Body, 
the fundamental purpose of these disciplines is essentially to preserve equal competitive 
                                                        
19 Ibid, para 5.320. 
20 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, paras 5.141-5.143. 
21 Ibid, para 5.167 (emphasis added). 
22 For a similar view, see Regan, above n 3, at 2.  
23 WTO Appellate Body, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products (US – Tuna II), WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13 June 2012, para 302.  
24 WTO Panel, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (EC – 
Seal Products), WT/DS400/DS401/R, adopted (as modified) 18 June 2014, para. 7.276, and further discussion 
in section III.B below.  
25 Due to the fact that the TBT Agreement does not contain a general exceptions clause similar to Article XX 
GATT, Article 2.1 TBT Agreement entails an additional step enquiring into whether the detrimental impact 
‘stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction’; see further section IV below. 
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opportunities for like (or competitive)26 products imported from all WTO members (MFN 
treatment) and for imported and like domestic products (national treatment).27 And yet, an 
exception to a trade-restrictive rule –be it a ban as in EC – Seal Products or another 
regulatory requirement– is prone to have a detrimental impact on competitive 
opportunities: that is, a disproportionally worse or disparate impact on products from 
country A that are subject to the trade-restrictive rule vis-à-vis those competitive products 
from country B that benefit from the exception. For instance, in the EC – Seal Products 
case, the combined operation of the IC exception and the ban led to de facto discrimination 
(under the MFN treatment obligation),28 because it was found to have a disparate impact 
on seal products from Canada and Norway (the majority of which were not eligible to 
access the EU market under the IC exception) when compared to like seal products29 from 
Greenland (the majority of which were eligible to access the EU market under the IC 
exception).30  
Under Articles I/III GATT and the first limb of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement (minus 
LRD prong), it thus suffices to demonstrate a detrimental impact on (or between) imports, 
while any rationale for such discriminatory effects becomes relevant only at the justification 
stage. Nonetheless, as a backdrop to that subsequent analysis, it is useful to clarify that the 
clearly defined ‘Inuit’ criterion 31  was the main reason why the majority of 
Canadian/Norwegian seal products did not qualify under the IC exception to access the 
EU market, given that Inuit hunts only make up a very small portion of the overall seal 
hunting in these two countries (roughly 5%). Conversely, in Greenland, the share of Inuit 
hunts in total seal hunting is much higher (about 95%), explaining why virtually all 
Greenlandic seal products were likely to qualify under the IC exception for placing on the 
EU market.32 Additionally, the undefined ‘subsistence’ criterion under IC exception33 had 
the effect of excluding Inuit seal products from Canada which, due to their small scale, 
relied on processing facilities and marketing channels used by commercially-hunted seal 
products while segregation between these products was allegedly too costly and 
impracticable.34 But even so, the crux of the dispute was the discrimination between seal 
                                                        
26 Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, above n 15, para 120, stating that the determination of 
likeness under Article 2.1 TBT Agreement is, as under Article III:4 GATT, ‘a determination about the nature 
and extent of a competitive relationship between and among the products at issue’. For an overview of case 
law on ‘likeness’, see Peter van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, 2013 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013), at 325-328, 360-368 and 386-394. 
27 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, paras 5.82, 5.93 and 5.116; see also WTO Appellate 
Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products 
(Recourse to Article 21.5 by Mexico), WT/DS381/AB/RW, adopted 3 December 2015, para 7.29. 
28 In addition, the MRM exception was found inconsistent with the national treatment obligation: Panel 
Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 24, paras 7.353 and 7.629. These findings were not appealed by the EU: 
Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, para 5.71.  
29Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 24, paras 7.137-7.138 and 7.594, where it was undisputed that all 
seal products were ‘like’, irrespective of whether they conformed or not to the IC exception requirements; see 
also paras 7.151-7.154 and 7.597, where the Panel rightly compared the entire group of Canadian/Norwegian 
imported seal products (conforming and non-conforming) vis-à-vis the entire group of Greenlandic imported 
seal products (conforming and non-conforming) for the purpose of the MFN claims. 
30 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, para 5.316; see also Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, 
above n 24, paras 7.159-7.164, 7.170 and 7.600.  
31 Regulation (EC) 1007/2009, above n 18, Article 3(1) and definition of ‘Inuit’ provided in Article 2(4). 
32 Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 24, para. 7.161 and footnotes 213-215; and para. 7.599, referring 
in particular to: COWI, ‘Study on Implementing Measures for Trade in Seal Products – Final Report’ (January 
2010), at 25-30, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/biodiversity/animal_welfare/seals/pdf/study_implementing_measures.pd
f.   
33 Regulation (EC) 1007/2009, above n 18, Article 3(1), while no definition of ‘subsistence’ is provided in the 
measure; and Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, para. 5.324. 
34 Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 24, para 7.314. 
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products from Greenlandic Inuit subsistence hunts and seal products from 
Canadian/Norwegian non-Inuit commercial hunts, and only marginally that between seal 
products from Inuit communities in different countries. 
In justifying any discriminatory effects of these rule/exception measures reflecting 
multiple competing purposes under the chapeau of Article XX GATT35 or/and the LRD 
prong of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement, two questions seem pertinent. As a first step, how do 
we determine which rationales are legitimate and capable of justifying 
discrimination/detrimental impact? In this regard, it appears important to distinguish 
between domestic regulations serving multiple legitimate purposes and those adopted for a 
mixture of proper and improper purposes: as Bartels puts it, ‘measures for which an improper 
purpose is disguised by an ostensibly legitimate purpose’. 36  It is, of course, quite a 
strenuous task to identify and agree on a set of legitimate objectives in the abstract. But for 
our purpose of justifying discrimination, it can be confidently stated that, at a minimum, 
protectionism and favouritism between trading partners are not justifiable rationales under 
GATT Article XX-chapeau and Article 2.1 TBT Agreement. 37 However, as Qin rightly 
notes, accepting the legitimacy of a given regulatory purpose does not automatically imbue 
the detrimental impact of a measure with justifiability.38 A second step in the justification 
analysis ought to look deeper into how a legitimate policy purpose is implemented, and in 
particular whether and to what extent the discriminatory effects of a measure are necessary 
to achieve such a purpose.39 The key challenge lies, therefore, in devising an interpretative 
framework that would allow us to respect WTO members’ right to adopt measures with 
multiple competing purposes, provided it can be shown these are genuinely legitimate and 
to the extent discrimination is necessary to attain them. Against this background, the next 
sections proceed to evaluate the relevant legal standards for justifying 
discrimination/detrimental impact under GATT Article XX-chapeau and the LRD prong 
of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement.  
 
III. MEASURES WITH MULTIPLE COMPETING PURPOSES AND 
UNJUSTIFIABLE DISRIMINATION UNDER GATT ARTICLE XX-
CHAPEAU  
 
A. Justifying Discrimination under the Chapeau: Rational Connection 
Requirement & Closed List 
                                                        
35 Note that, under Article XX GATT, there is a prior condition that the measure be provisionally justified 
under one of the subparagraphs, but we are here concerned only with the discriminatory effects of an 
exception to a trade-restrictive rule, which are generally appraised under the chapeau: see Appellate Body 
Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, para. 5.136; and Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, above n 
14, para 217 and 226-227. 
36 Lorand Bartels, ‘The Chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS Agreements: A 
Reconstruction’ (2015) 109 American Journal of International Law 95, at 123 and 125, arguing further that the 
condition in the chapeau of Article XX GATT prohibiting measures constituting a ‘disguised restriction on 
international trade’ is most relevant for scrutinizing such mixed-purposes measures.  
37 Arguably, protectionism and favouritism go against the general spirit of the WTO and the letter of the 
chapeau of Article XX GATT and the preamble of the TBT Agreement (sixth recital), and in particular 
‘disguised restriction on international trade’. Moreover, in the GATT context, there are other exceptions 
clauses specifically permitting favouritism (e.g., Article XXIV GATT for purpose of regional integration) or 
protectionism (Article XVIII:A GATT for the purpose of infant-industry protection), subject to specific 
conditions set out therein.   
38 Julia Y. Qin, ‘Defining Nondiscrimination under the Law of the World Trade Organization’ (2005) 23(2) 
Boston University International Law Journal 215, at 265. 
39  Ibid., at 267-269; and Bartels, above n 36, at 118-119 arguing this approach was followed in: WTO 
Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – Gasoline), 
WT/DS2/4/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996 and WTO Appellate Body, United States – Import Prohibition of 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US – Shrimp), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998.  
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Unlike the substantive non-discrimination obligations just seen, the chapeau of Article XX 
GATT does not, by its express terms, prohibit all discrimination but only discrimination 
‘between countries where the same conditions prevail’ that is ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’.40 
And yet, in spite of the decisive role the chapeau has played in a number of WTO 
disputes,41 the central question of how to determine whether discrimination can be justified 
is still uncertain. In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate Body held that this determination 
‘should focus on the cause of the discrimination, or the rationale put forward to explain its 
existence.’42 This statement makes intuitive sense: if the rationales advanced by the WTO 
member responsible for the discrimination could not be the reference point for its 
justifiability, what could be? And yet, it raises another question: is any rationale acceptable 
as a justification for discrimination under the chapeau of Article XX GATT?  
The chapeau’s text leaves this issue largely open, with no express limit on the set of 
possible justifiable rationales for discrimination.43 In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, however, the 
Appellate Body limited the range of legitimate justifications by stating that discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail would be unjustifiable whenever ‘the 
reasons given for this discrimination bear no rational connection to the objective falling 
within the purview of a paragraph of Article XX, or would go against that objective.’44 It 
further specified that the assessment of whether discrimination is unjustifiable should be 
made in the light of the objective that provided the basis for the measure’s provisional 
justification under a given subparagraph of Article XX GATT.45 In the case of measures 
pursuing multiple competing purposes, this means in light of the principal objective of the 
measure only –i.e., that which motivated the adoption of the trade-restrictive rule, and not 
the rationale underlying the exception.46 Moreover, the Appellate Body appeared to elevate 
the question of whether there is a rational connection between the reasons for the 
discrimination and the (main) objective of the measure to some sort of litmus test: that is, 
the absence of such a rational connection will be in itself dispositive for a finding of 
unjustifiable discrimination and bring the appraisal of the measure under GATT Article 
XX-chapeau to an end.47 Not surprisingly, the complainants in EC – Seal Products sought to 
rely on this earlier case law as the basis for their claim that the discrimination resulting 
from the IC exception was not justifiable under the chapeau of GATT Article XX, arguing 
that its Inuit protection purpose was not rationally connected to, but clearly went against, 
the measure’s main objective of protecting seal welfare.48  
                                                        
40 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, above n 39, p. 23; Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, above n 39, para 
150. The Appellate Body has thus far refrained from drawing a clear distinction between ‘arbitrary’ and 
‘unjustifiable’ discrimination. For simplicity, this paper will generally refer to ‘unjustifiable’ discrimination 
following the definition suggested in Bartels, above n 36, at 122-123, as ‘discrimination for which the 
proposed rationale either is illegitimate or does not justify the measure that has been adopted.’ 
41 See, inter alia, Bartels, above n 36, at 96.  
42 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, above n 14, para. 226. 
43 This observation is also made in Bartels, above n 36, at 118; Qin, above n 3, at 5.  
44 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, above n 14, para. 227.  
45 Ibid, para. 227. This was a departure from its previous jurisprudence that the ‘policy objective of a measure 
issue cannot provide its rationale or justification under the standards of the chapeau of Article XX’: Appellate 
Body Report, US – Shrimp, above n 39, para 149. For a critical discussion, see S. Gaines, ‘The WTO’s 
Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures’ (2001) 
22(4) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 739, at 776-781; see also A. Davies, 
‘Interpreting the Chapeau of GATT Article XX in Light of the New Approach in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres’ 
(2009) 43(3) Journal of World Trade 507, at 518-521.  
46On this distinction, see section II above.  
47 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, above n 14, para 227. 
48 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, paras 2.39-2.40, 2.96 and 5.318.  
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The problem is, however, that this rational connection requirement is excessively 
rigid and rather senseless when dealing with measures accommodating multiple competing 
purposes.49 This is because when an exception is inserted to balance between competing 
policy purposes, 50  its underlying rationale will not only differ from but necessarily go 
against the objective justifying the general (trade-restrictive) rule.51  That being so, it is 
simply pointless to ask whether the reasons given for the discrimination resulting from that 
exception are rationally connected to the measure’s main objective. Evidently, this question 
can only be answered in the negative, resulting ipso facto in a finding of unjustifiable 
discrimination. In this way, applying a strict rational connection requirement predetermines 
the outcome of the analysis under GATT Article XX-chapeau to a finding of unjustifiable 
discrimination: if the rationale for discrimination can never differ, or contradict, the main 
objective of the measure, there is simply no meaningful opportunity for WTO members to 
ever justify measures accommodating competing policy purposes. This rigidity is obviously 
problematic because it does not even allow for a genuine investigation into whether the 
rationale for the exception, and hence for the discrimination, is or not legitimate. And yet, 
there is no ground to assume that a rational disconnect with the measure’s main objective 
is per se evidence that the purpose underlying an exception is improper. A case in point is 
the IC exception, whose Inuit protection purpose has been broadly recognized as being 
legitimate in, 52  inter alia, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
People 53  and in the ILO Declaration concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in 
Independent Countries,54 as well as several national measures (including Canada’s sealing 
regulations).55 
The inception of a rational connection requirement in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres was 
possibly motivated by the specific circumstances of that case which, arguably, did not 
concern an exception reflecting a genuinely competing legitimate purpose. The challenged 
measure was an import prohibition (and associated fines) on retreaded tyres adopted for 
public health purposes (i.e., reducing exposure to health risks arising from the 
accumulation of waste tyres), 56  while exempting MERCOSUR countries even though 
retreaded tyres from these countries were found to pose comparable health risks to those 
originating in the complaining WTO member (the EU).57 The explanation offered by Brazil 
for justifying this discrimination between MERCOSUR and non-MERCOSUR countries 
                                                        
49 Another problem is that the rational connection standard illogically duplicates the preceding enquiry of 
whether there is discrimination ‘between countries where the same conditions prevail’, which is already 
determined in light of the measure’s objective: see Bartels, above n 36, at 112 and 116. 
50 It is not always the case that an exception reflects a different policy purpose, but may in some instances be 
motivated by the same purpose as the general rule. An example is offered by the 1961 UN Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, which limits the production, distribution and trade in narcotic drugs for human health and 
welfare purposes, while exclusively permitting the use of such substances for medical and scientific purposes.  
51 This point was also recognized by the Panel in EC – Seal Products, above n 24, para. 7.298, footnote 477; 
and reiterated by the EU but not addressed on appeal: Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, 
paras 2.100 and 2.149.     
52 Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 24, paras 7.292 and 7.295-7.296, referring to these international 
instruments as ‘factual evidence’ of the broadly recognized importance of preserving Inuit culture and 
tradition and sustaining their livelihood.  
53 UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, A/RES/61/295, 
adopted on 13 September 2007. Most relevantly, see: Articles 5, 8(2)(b), 20(1) and 32. 
54  International Labour Organization, Convention No 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in 
Independent Countries, adopted 27 June 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382. Most relevantly, see Article 15(1). Ironically, 
only three EU Member States (i.e., Denmark, the Netherlands, and Spain) have actually ratified this ILO 
Convention. 
55 Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 24, para 7.294 and footnote 472.  
56 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, above n 14, para 134.  
57 Ibid, para 217. 
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was the alleged need to comply with a ruling issued by a MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal.58 
However, some passages of the Appellate Body’s reasoning appear to suggest that this 
declared compliance purpose underlying the MERCOSUR exemption could not be 
considered a valid legitimate rationale in the specific context of justifying discrimination 
under the chapeau of Article XX GATT.59 Notably, it was questionable whether Brazil had 
an actual obligation under MERCOSUR to exempt its regional partners from the import 
ban, except by virtue of the fact that it had not raised the public health defence available 
under the regional agreement (analogue to Article XX(b) GATT) in the MERCOSUR 
proceedings.60 In other words, it was far from clear that there was a need for Brazil to make 
a trade-off between complying with its MERCOSUR obligations and achieving its public 
health objective.61  
In sum, the key point made here is that applying a strict rational connection 
requirement is not a sensible basis for identifying legitimate rationales capable of justifying 
discrimination under the chapeau of Article XX GATT. One cannot simply invalidate a 
justifying purpose as illegitimate just because it is independent from, or even undermines, 
the main objective of the measure. Accordingly, it is submitted that the justification analysis 
under the chapeau of Article XX GATT should not be restrained by a rational connection 
requirement, but instead enquire into whether the rationale given for the discrimination –
be it the main objective of the measure, or another reason put forward by the regulating 
WTO member– is or is not legitimate.  
 
B. Revisiting the Rational Connection Standard in EC – Seal Products: Some 
Way But Not Far Enough  
 
In EC – Seal Products, the Appellate Body was directly confronted with the question of 
whether the (legitimate) purpose of protecting Inuit cultural identity and subsistence could 
justify discrimination under the chapeau of Article XX GATT, even if this rationale clearly 
went against the principal objective of protecting seal welfare.62 As such, this case offered 
the perfect opportunity for the Appellate Body to revise its self-imposed rational 
connection requirement, but whether and how far it did so is not entirely clear and remains 
a subject of academic debate.63 In dealing with this issue, the Appellate Body began by 
reiterating the significance of the rational connection standard as ‘one of the most 
important factors’64 in the assessment of unjustifiable discrimination under the chapeau, 
while somehow refining it vis-à-vis Brazil – Retreaded Tyres. It ruled that:  
‘[T]he European Union has failed to demonstrate, in our view, how the 
discrimination resulting from the manner in which the EU Seal Regime treats IC 
hunts as compared to “commercial” hunts can be reconciled with, or is related to, the 
policy objective of addressing EU public moral concerns regarding seal welfare. In this 
connection, we note that the European Union has not established, for example, why 
the need to protect the economic and social interests of the Inuit and other indigenous peoples 
necessarily implies that the European Union cannot do anything further to ensure that the welfare 
of seals is addressed in the context of IC hunts, given that “IC hunts can cause the very 
pain and suffering for seals that the EU public is concerned about”.’65 
                                                        
58 Ibid, para 226. 
59 Ibid, para 232.  
60 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, above n 14, para 234. 
61 For a similar view, see Levy and Regan, above n 16, at 364-365; and Regan, above n 3, at 4.  
62 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, paras 5.308-5.309 and 5.318. 
63 See e.g., Bartels, above n 36, at 117; Regan, above n 3, at 3; Qin, above n 3, at 4.  
64 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, para 5.318. 
65 Ibid, para 5.320 (emphasis added). 
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This statement is, regrettably, ambivalent particularly if one considers its practical 
implications as to whether or not withdrawing the IC exception is deemed necessary to 
comply with the chapeau of Article XX GATT. The first part of the statement harks back 
to the rigid rational connection requirement in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres: discrimination can 
only be justified by reasons that are rationally related to the main objective of the measure 
(in casu, seal welfare). In practical terms, this would imply that the IC exception would need 
to be removed for the EU seal regime to meet the chapeau requirements of Article XX 
GATT. Yet the second part of the statement appears to suggest something subtler: 
discrimination may, in principle, be justified by reasons that are unrelated to the main 
objective of the measure (in casu, Inuit protection), provided that the responding WTO 
member can establish that the two purposes are genuinely competing and implicate a 
regulatory trade-off. In other words, the Appellate Body seems here to be (implicitly) 
accepting the protection of Inuit interests as a legitimate justification for discrimination 
under the chapeau, but requiring the EU to demonstrate that there is no reasonable 
alternative (i.e., it ‘cannot do anything further’) that would achieve this Inuit protection 
purpose while being less inconsistent with the seal welfare objective of the measure. In 
practical terms, this would mean that the IC exception can be retained to the extent that it is 
shown that the two regulatory purposes cannot be reconciled –i.e., the need to protect 
Inuit interests ‘necessarily implies’ the EU can do nothing to ensure that the welfare of 
seals is addressed in the context of IC hunts. 
This second position seems more reasonable, but the Appellate Body did not 
follow through by explaining why it considered the EU had failed to establish that the Inuit 
protection and seal welfare purposes were in effect competing. This lack of reasoning is 
regrettable and results in ambiguity at both normative and practical levels. From a 
normative perspective, there was no attempt to evaluate whether or not improving seal 
welfare in the context of IC hunts would put at risk the subsistence of the Inuit and the 
preservation of their cultural identity, and thus be contrary to the international 
commitments mentioned above. 66  In this connection, the Appellate Body could have 
considered and assessed the validity of the EU’s argument before the Panel that the 
application of inhumane hunting methods, such as trapping and netting, is ‘indispensable 
for the subsistence of the Inuit, who otherwise would not be able to hunt during almost 
half of the year’.67 Besides this, it is unclear what the EU could be reasonably expected to 
do at a more practical level to ensure seal welfare is addressed in the context of IC hunts. 
This is so, in particular, in light of the Appellate Body’s previous finding that the inherent 
welfare risks of seal hunting pose an obstacle to the effective monitoring and enforcement 
of the application of humane killing methods, and that such risks are present in seal hunts 
in general (including IC hunts).68 This tension is, in fact, apparent in the Commission’s 
proposal for amending the EU Seal Regulation: on the one hand, it states that ‘a genuinely 
humane killing method cannot be effectively and consistently applied in the hunts 
conducted by the Inuit and other indigenous communities, just like in the other seal 
                                                        
66 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, para 5.320, footnote 1559, seemingly agreeing with 
Canada that the burden of proof is on the respondent, but without explaining why. Criticizing this point, see 
Bartels, above n 36, at 121. 
67 Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 24, para 7.276; and para 7.295; see also European Union, 
Responses to the Panel’s Questions following the Second Meeting, dated 23 May 2013, Question 122, para 
76, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/wtodispute/show.cfm?id=475&code=2#_eu-submissions.  
68 This finding was made in the context of the necessity analysis under Article XX(a) GATT (and Article 2.2 
TBT Agreement), and relied upon for determining that the alternative measure proposed by the complainants 
(i.e., animal welfare certification and labelling requirements) was not ‘reasonably available’ to the EU: Panel 
Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 24, paras 7.224 and 7.496-7.497; and Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal 
Products, above n 2, para 5.289. 
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hunts’,69 while on the other hand it makes the use of the IC exception conditional upon 
new minimum standards on humane seal hunting. 70 But what is the point of formally 
introducing minimum seal welfare requirements into the IC exception if their application 
cannot be effectively monitored and enforced by the EU? In these factual circumstances, 
the proposed amendment seems largely pointless as it is unlikely to make IC hunts more 
seal-friendly in practice, and thus it does not serve to explain (nor to reduce) the 
discrimination between seal products from IC and commercial hunts. 
Leaving its stance on the rational connection standard ambiguous, the Appellate 
Body proceeded to fault the EU measure for ‘additional factors’ 71 that went beyond the 
justifiability of the rationale for the IC exception, and which pertain to the manner in 
which it was designed and applied.72 The first was that the IC exception contained no 
safeguard against its potential abuse. Due to certain ambiguities in the ‘subsistence’ and 
‘partial use’ criteria, coupled with the broad discretion consequently enjoyed by recognized 
bodies in applying them, ‘seal products derived from what should in fact be properly 
characterized as ‘commercial’ hunts could potentially enter the EU market under the IC 
exception.’73 The second was that the European Union had not made ‘comparable efforts’ 
to facilitate market access for seal products derived from Canadian Inuit hunts as it did 
with respect to Greenlandic Inuit hunts, resulting in a de facto exclusivity of the IC 
exception to the benefit of the latter.74  
Bartels posits that this additional enquiry indicates that the Appellate Body implicitly 
accepted that the IC exception was otherwise justifiable under GATT Article XX-chapeau, 
despite the rational disconnect between its Inuit protection rationale and the main seal 
welfare objective of the measure. He argues that, had the Appellate Body treated this 
rational disconnect as dispositive for a violation of the chapeau, it would have disposed of 
the case at this early stage without further examining whether the IC exception could be 
designed and applied in a less discriminatory manner.75 This is a pertinent point, but an 
equally possible reading is that the Appellate Body was just piling on additional reasons that 
aggravated its overall finding that the EU seal regime resulted in unjustifiable 
discrimination under GATT Article XX-chapeau. Indeed, this alternative reading seems to 
be supported by the conclusive paragraph of the ruling,76 where the rational disconnect 
between the discrimination and the seal welfare objective is given pride of place among the 
factors for condemning the EU seal regime.77 But in any event, we should not have been 
                                                        
69  European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products, COM(2015) 45 final, dated 6 February 
2015, at 5; see also European Union, above n 67, Question 133, para 126, where the EU submitted that 
‘effective monitoring and enforcement would be even less viable in the IC hunts than in the case of commercial 
seal hunts …’ (emphasis added). 
70 European Commission, above n 69, Article 3(1)(c); incorporated by Council and European Parliament 
Regulation (EU) 2015/1775, OJ 2015 L 262/1, Article 3(1)(c).  
71 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, para 5.321, where the Appellate Body stated: ‘[t]he 
relationship of the discrimination to the objective of a measure is one of the most important factors, but not the sole 
test, that is relevant to the assessment of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. In other words, depending 
on the nature of the measure at issue and the circumstances of the case at hand, there could be additional 
factors that may also be relevant to that overall assessment.’ (emphasis added).  
72 This is welcome departure from the Appellate Body’s somehow superficial distinction between the ‘design’ 
(or contents) and ‘application’ of the measure under Article XX GATT: see Bartels, above n 36, at 6-7.  
73 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, para 5.328; and paras 5.324-5.327 for full reasoning.   
74 Ibid, para. 5.333-5.337.  
75 Bartels, above n 36, at 119.  
76 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, para 5.338, stating that: ‘[…] we have identified several 
features of the EU Seal Regime that indicate that the regime is applied in a manner that constitutes a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, in particular 
with respect to the IC exception.’ (emphasis added). 
77 Ibid, para. 5.338; cf. above n 65 and accompanying text. 
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left to speculate on the relative weight of the rational connection standard under the 
chapeau of Article XX GATT. Given that this was the crux of disagreement between the 
parties in EC – Seal Products, the Appellate Body should have taken a clear position on the 
matter. And for the reasons previously mentioned,78 that position should have been to 
relinquish rational connection as a strict requirement by unequivocally stating that 
discrimination under the chapeau can be justified by a legitimate purpose, even if it is 
separate from, or goes against, the main objective of the measure.  
It could well be, as Bartels and others 79 suggest, that the Appellate Body at least 
tacitly accepted the Inuit protection purpose as an independent legitimate rationale for 
justifying discrimination under the chapeau of Article XX GATT. But this is still 
disappointing because we are left to wonder on which normative grounds it did so. The 
protection of Inuit cultural tradition and subsistence is not explicitly mentioned in the 
closed list of policy objectives of Article XX GATT. While it could arguably be considered 
a matter of ‘public morals’ under Article XX(a) GATT, both the Panel and the Appellate 
Body found there was insufficient evidence to do so in this particular case.80 This raises an 
important question: does EC – Seal Products then imply a broadening of permissible 
justifications for discrimination under the chapeau beyond the legitimate objectives listed in 
the subparagraphs of Article XX GATT? And if so, only insofar as the legitimacy of a 
(non-listed) policy objective enjoys broad-based international recognition? This could be 
inferred from EC – Seal Products, given that the need to preserve Inuit cultural identity and 
to sustain their livelihood has been broadly recognized in a number of international 
instruments.81 And yet, the Appellate Body omitted any reference to these international law 
sources, cited by both the EU and the Panel, when addressing the justifiability of the IC 
exception under the chapeau.82 As a result, the Appellate Body’s approach has left great 
uncertainty as to the normative basis for identifying legitimate justifications under the 
chapeau of Article XX GATT.  
Furthermore, the Appellate Body’s decision in EC – Seal Products was not fully 
satisfactory for another reason. Once it is established that Inuit protection can be a valid 
justification under GATT Article XX-chapeau, the next critical issue is whether the 
discrimination resulting from the IC exception is actually necessary to achieve such a 
legitimate purpose. From this standpoint, it becomes easier to understand why the 
Appellate Body condemned the EU measure for discriminating between commercial seal 
products originating in different countries (i.e., by not safeguarding against potential abuse 
of the IC exception), as well as between Inuit seal products of Greenlandic and Canadian 
origin (i.e., by making the IC exception de facto available only to Greenland): 83  this 
discrimination was in no way necessary to preserve Inuit cultural identity and sustain their 
livelihood. Indeed, in the amended EU Seal Regulation, provisions have been made to 
prevent the abuse of the IC exception by the importation of seal products derived from 
hunts conducted primarily for commercial purposes,84 while ‘comparable efforts’ are being 
                                                        
78 See section III.A above.  
79 See above n 75; and also Gregory Shaffer and David Pavian, ‘The WTO EC Seal Products Decision: 
Animal Welfare, Indigenous Communities and Trade’ (2015) University of California Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series No 2015-17, at 6. 
80 Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 24, para 7.299; see also Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal 
Products, above n 2, para 5.148. For a critical discussion, see Elizabeth Whitsitt, ‘A Comment on the Public 
Morals Exception in International Trade and the EC – Seal Products Case: Moral Imperialism and Other 
Concerns’ (2014) 3(4) Cambridge of International and Comparative Law 1376.  
81 See above n 53 and n 54. 
82 Criticizing this approach, see Shaffer and Pavian, above n 79, at 7. 
83 See above n 72 and 73; and accompanying text.   
84 Regulation (EU) 2015/1775, above n 70, Preamble, fifth recital and Article 3(5).  
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made to facilitate its use by Canadian Inuit.85 Both of these amendments thus confirm that 
the Inuit protection purpose can be achieved in a less discriminatory manner than in the 
original EU measure. But this was a relatively ancillary matter in the dispute, as the bulk of 
the discrimination associated with the IC exception was –and will remain even after these 
amendments– between seal products derived from Greenlandic Inuit subsistence hunts 
(conforming/permitted) and from Canadian/Norwegian non-Inuit commercial hunts (non-
conforming/prohibited). 86  Therefore, the Appellate Body should have also considered 
whether this discrimination was necessary to protect Inuit subsistence and cultural identity. 
In other words, the key question it should have but did not address is whether there was a 
less discriminatory alternative to the carve-out from the ban, which was reasonably 
available to the EU in order to protect such Inuit interests. 
In conclusion, the Appellate Body ambivalently loosened the rational connection 
standard under the chapeau of Article XX GATT in EC – Seal Products, but it never went as 
far as flatly saying that discrimination can be justified by a legitimate policy purpose, even if 
it is unrelated or goes against the main objective of the measure. As we have seen, its 
ambivalent approach and limited reasoning have left a number of critical puzzles 
unresolved. It would have been more sensible for the Appellate Body to unambiguously 
discard rational connection as a requirement under the chapeau, to explicitly accept the 
Inuit protection purpose as an independent legitimate justification on the basis of its 
broad-based international recognition, and then to fully assess whether the discrimination 
associated with the IC exception was necessary to achieve that purpose. Had it done so, the 
Appellate Body would have laid down a clearer analytical framework for appraising 
measures accommodating multiple competing purposes under GATT Article XX-chapeau 
in future cases. But most importantly, as will be seen next, it would also have brought the 
unjustifiable discrimination test under the chapeau in closer alignment with its reasoning 
under the LRD prong of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement.  
 
IV. MEASURES WITH MULTIPLE COMPETING PURPOSES AND 
LEGTIMATE REGULATORY DISTINCTION UNDER ARTICLE 2.1 TBT 
AGREEMENT 
 
A. Justifying Detrimental Impact under Article 2.1 TBT Agreement: No 
Rational Connection Requirement & Open List 
 
The terms ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’ appear nowhere in the TBT Agreement but 
were first coined by the Appellate Body in US – Clove Cigarettes, where it held that: ‘[…] the 
context and object and purpose of the TBT Agreement weigh in favour of reading the 
“treatment no less favourable” requirement of Article 2.1 as prohibiting both de jure and de 
facto discrimination against imported products, while at the same time permitting 
detrimental impact on competitive opportunities for imports that stems exclusively from 
legitimate regulatory distinctions.’87 In this way, the Appellate Body introduced a basis for 
justifying detrimental impact on (or between) imports and thereby placed the balance 
between the objective of trade liberalization and WTO members’ right to regulate within 
Article 2.1 TBT Agreement, given that this agreement does not contain a general 
exceptions clause similar to Article XX GATT. 88  Whereas it is sensible to read such 
                                                        
85 European Commission, Decision on the Joint Statement by Canada and the European Union on Access to 
the European Union of Seal Products from Indigenous Communities of Canada, C(2014) 5881 final, dated 18 
August 2014. 
86 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, para 5.316; and section II above.  
87 Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, above n 15, para 175.  
88 Ibid, paras 94-96 and 101. 
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flexibility into Article 2.1 TBT Agreement, 89  the Appellate Body has provided limited 
guidance as to what this new LDR test actually entails. Most recently in US – COOL 
(Article 21.5), it stated that the legitimacy of regulatory distinctions for the purpose of 
justifying detrimental impact in the context of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement is essentially ‘a 
function of whether they are designed and applied in an even-handed manner’.90 On its plain 
meaning, even-handedness requires the relevant regulatory distinction to be ‘unbiased’, 
‘impartial’ or ‘fair’, but these terms do not mean much in the abstract: even-handed in light 
of what? In other words, what is the point of reference through which the even-handedness 
(and hence, the legitimacy) of the regulatory distinction at issue is to be assessed? And most 
significantly for present purposes, does this assessment of even-handedness embody a 
rational connection standard, similar to that previously discussed in relation to the chapeau 
of Article XX GATT?  
This latter question has been highly contested before several WTO panels, with 
different approaches taken depending on the specific circumstances of the case. 91 
Nevertheless, it is here submitted that the Appellate Body itself has not articulated or 
applied a strict rational connection requirement under Article 2.1 TBT Agreement. Instead, 
as illustrated in Table 1 below, the Appellate Body has adopted a more flexible approach to 
the range of permissible justifications for detrimental impact. 
 
Table 1 – Detrimental Impact/Justification in TBT Trilogy Cases 
    
AB Report Cause of Detrimental 
Impact 
Justifying Rationales 
US – Clove Cigarettes (2012) Ban/exception Main objective/reasons for 
exception  
US – Tuna II (2012) Difference in labelling 
conditions 
Main (mutually supportive) 
objectives 
US – COOL (2012) Segregation through record-
keeping/verification 
requirements 
Main (sole) objective 
 
To be sure, in all three cases, the main objective of the technical regulation at issue was a 
point of reference for assessing the even-handedness of the regulatory distinction causing 
the detrimental impact. Thus, in US – Tuna II, the Appellate Body found that the 
regulatory distinction causing the detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products92 was not 
even-handed in light of the objectives of the measure (i.e., dolphin protection/consumer 
information),93 because it was not ‘calibrated to the risks to dolphins arising from different 
                                                        
89 Ibid, para 169; see also WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
Requirements (US – COOL), WT/DS384/DS386/AB/R, adopted 23 July 2012, para 268. 
90WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling Requirements (Recourse to Article 
21.5 by Canada and Mexico), WT/DS384/DS386/AB/RW, adopted 29 May 2015, para 5.93 (emphasis added). 
91 See notably, WTO Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
and Tuna Products (Recourse to Article 21.5 by Mexico), WT/DS381/RW, adopted (as modified) 3 December 
2015, paras 7.80-7.91 and 7.916; and WTO Panel Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
Requirements (Recourse to Article 21. 5 by Canada and Mexico), WT/DS384/DS386/RW, adopted (as modified) 29 
May 2015, paras 7.214-7.217. Cf with Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 24, paras 7.259 and 7.296-
7.298.  
92 Namely, the difference in labelling conditions for tuna products caught by setting on dolphins in the 
Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) and not eligible for the ‘dolphin-safe’ label (primarily of Mexican origin) and 
those for tuna products caught by other fishing methods outside the ETP and eligible for the ‘dolphin-safe’ 
label (primarily from the United States and other countries): Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II, above n 
23, para 284. 
93 Ibid, paras 242 and 282. 
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fishing methods in different areas of the ocean.’94 Similarly, in US – COOL, the finding that 
the relevant regulatory distinction 95  lacked even-handedness was made in view of the 
objective of the measure: that is, the recordkeeping and verification requirements causing 
detrimental impact on imported livestock could ‘not be explained by the need to provide 
origin information to consumers.’96 In this sense, as most recently clarified by the Appellate 
Body in US – Tuna II (Article 21.5), the nexus between the regulatory distinction causing 
detrimental impact and the main objective of the measure can be a pertinent factor in the 
even-handedness analysis, depending on the ‘particular circumstances of the case’.97 
Yet importantly, it does not follow that detrimental impact under Article 2.1 TBT 
Agreement can never be explained by reference to reasons other than the main objective of 
the measure. Quite the contrary, the Appellate Body conceded this possibility in US – Clove 
Cigarettes, where the regulatory distinction giving rise to the detrimental impact was an 
exception for menthol cigarettes (mainly domestically produced) from the general ban on 
cigarettes with a characterizing flavour (primarily clove cigarettes imported from 
Indonesia). Having found that this distinction between prohibited clove cigarettes and 
permitted menthol cigarettes could not be explained by the principal objective of the 
measure (i.e., to reduce youth smoking),98 the Appellate Body went on to consider whether 
other unrelated reasons put forward by the United States (i.e., the alleged risks of healthcare 
costs and black market smuggling arising from withdrawal symptoms that would afflict 
menthol smokers) could nonetheless justify the regulatory distinction, and thus the 
detrimental impact on imported clove cigarettes. Ultimately, the Appellate Body did not 
find these independent reasons sufficiently persuasive, not on the ground that such reasons 
were unrelated to the main objective of reducing youth smoking, but because it was unclear 
the risks alleged by the US would actually materialize.99  
Therefore, the core point for present purposes is that the LRD prong of Article 2.1 
TBT Agreement is not restrained by a rigid rational connection requirement. Instead, the 
Appellate Body has explicitly left open the possibility that a regulatory distinction may be 
found to be legitimate, and hence capable of justifying detrimental impact, in spite of a 
rational disconnect between its rationale and the main objective of the measure.100 This 
flexibility is more sensible for dealing with measures pursuing multiple competing 
purposes, insofar as it allows for a genuine investigation into whether the rationale for the 
                                                        
94 Ibid, para 297. 
95 Namely, the recordkeeping and verification requirements that necessitated segregation, and that created an 
incentive for US producers to process exclusively domestic livestock and a disincentive to process imported 
livestock: Appellate Body Report, US – COOL, above n 89, paras 342 and 348.  
96 Appellate Body Report, US – COOL, above n 89, paras 347-349. This was because the level of information 
conveyed to consumers through the mandatory retail labels was far less detailed and accurate than the 
information required to be tracked and transmitted by the upstream producers and processors, while the US 
had supplied ‘no rational basis for this disconnect’. Consequently, the regulatory distinctions drawn in the 
COOL measure were found to be arbitrary and the ‘disproportionate burden’ imposed on upstream 
producers and processors unjustifiable.   
97 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Article 21.5), above n 27, paras 7.85 and 7.97, where it is stated that 
rational connection is not a ‘single-factor test that should always and exclusively be used’, but ‘one way of 
demonstrating that a measure is not even-handed’ (emphasis in original).  
98 Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, above n 15, para 225, noting that both clove and menthol 
cigarettes are equally appealing to youth. 
99 Ibid, para 225, where the Appellate Body found that ‘it is not clear that the risks that the United States 
claims to minimize by allowing menthol cigarettes to remain in the market would materialize if menthol 
cigarettes were to be banned, insofar as regular cigarettes would remain in the market’. 
100 This reading of US – Clove Cigarettes was echoed by the Panel in EC – Seal Products, above n 24, para 7.259 
and footnote 415. For further discussion, see Gracia Marín Durán, ‘Measures with Multiple Policy Objectives 
and Article 2.1 TBT Agreement: A GATT-like Balance, or a Likely Conflict, after EC – Seal Products? CTEI 
Working Paper 2015-06, at 19-20, 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/home/research/centresandprogrammes/ctei/working_papers.html.  
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exception, and hence for the detrimental impact, is or is not legitimate. But it logically 
raises a separate question: which rationales are acceptable for the purpose of justifying 
detrimental impact under Article 2.1 TBT Agreement?  
The text of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement leaves this issue entirely open absent a list 
of legitimate objectives therein, while the Appellate Body has generally evaded defining the 
scope of legitimacy under this specific provision.101 In this regard, Marceau argues that 
what ought to be legitimate under Article 2.1 TBT Agreement is the difference in 
regulatory treatment itself, and not the objective per se.102 Whereas it is true that the two 
concepts are not fully akin, it is hard to see how a regulatory distinction could be deemed 
legitimate unless it is based on a legitimate purpose. As aptly explained by the Panel in EC – 
Seal Products, the existence of a legitimate purpose alone would not automatically lead to 
establishing the legitimacy of the regulatory distinction, but it is a necessary element for its 
justifiability. 103  Arguably, the legitimacy of most policy objectives at issue in the TBT 
trilogy cases could be tacitly assumed –i.e., public health protection in US – Clove Cigarettes; 
dolphin protection/consumer information in US – Tuna II and consumer information on 
origin in US – COOL.104 However, the limits of this approach became evident in US – 
COOL (Article 21.5), when the Appellate Body was confronted with the question of 
whether costs savings enjoyed by US entities through the exemptions in the amended 
COOL measure could justify the detrimental impact on imported livestock.105 It had little 
choice but to assert that ‘[such] cost considerations do not constitute a supervening 
justification for discriminatory measures’.106 This does not mean that WTO members may 
not seek to minimize domestic costs when adopting technical regulations. But that is 
different from accepting domestic costs considerations as a legitimate rationale for 
justifying detrimental impact against imports –put another way, for imposing costs only or 
mainly on other WTO members.107  
Thus, the approach to legitimacy favoured by the Appellate Body in the context of 
Article 2.1 TBT Agreement is to identify on a case-by-case basis a shorter list of regulatory 
purposes that are considered improper for justifying detrimental impact, rather than 
looking for a positive list of legitimate objectives. However, as rightly noted by Levy and 
Regan, focusing on restraining illegitimate purposes under Article 2.1 TBT Agreement may 
mean that a wider range of policy objectives are permissible for justifying discrimination 
under that provision than under GATT Article XX-chapeau.108 The Appellate Body shied 
away from addressing this systemic issue when raised by the EU in EC – Seal Products, and 
retorted that: ‘[…] beyond stating that the list of legitimate objectives that may factor into 
an analysis under Article 2.1 [TBT Agreement] is open, in contrast to the closed list of 
                                                        
101 See e.g., Appellate Body Report, US – COOL, above n 89, paras 330-331, where Canada and Mexico 
disputed whether the objective pursued by the COOL measure (i.e., consumer information on origin) was 
legitimate in the context of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement. The Appellate Body only addressed claims regarding 
the legitimacy of the measure’s objective in the context of Article 2.2 TBT Agreement (para 332 and footnote 
632). 
102 Gabrielle Marceau, ‘The New Jurisprudence in US – Clove Cigarettes, US – Tuna II and US – COOL’ 
(2013) 8 Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy, at 28 (footnote 111).  
103 Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 24, para 7.279. 
104 These are explicitly recognised as such in both the sixth recital of the preamble of the TBT Agreement and 
Article 2.2 TBT. In relation to consumer information, see Appellate Body Report, US – COOL, above n 89, 
para 445. 
105 Appellate Body Report, US – COOL (Article 21.5), above n 90, paras 5.110-5.113.  
106 Ibid, para 5.116. 
107 Appellate Body Report, US – Clove – Cigarettes, above n 15, para 221, footnote 431: ‘[n]othing in Article 2.1 
prevents a Member from seeking to minimize the potential costs arising from technical regulations, provided 
that the technical regulation at issue does not overtly or covertly discriminate against imports.’ (emphasis 
added). 
108 Levy and Regan, above n 16, at 362.  
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objectives enumerated under Article XX [GATT], the European Union has not pointed to 
any concrete examples of a legitimate objective that could factor into an analysis under 
Article 2.1 [TBT Agreement] but would not fall within the scope of Article XX [GATT].’109 
This appears to be a hint by the Appellate Body that we should not be too concerned 
about the formal asymmetry across agreements, as it intends to interpret the closed list of 
legitimate objectives in Article XX GATT in a way that covers all regulatory purposes that 
may fall within the open list of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement. Some regulatory purposes 
considered legitimate under the TBT Agreement can be easily integrated into Article XX 
GATT: an example is consumer information on origin at issue in US – COOL, where the 
Appellate Body held that it ‘bears some relation to the objective of prevention of deceptive 
practices reflected in both Article 2.2 [TBT Agreement] itself and Article XX(d) 
[GATT].’110 In addition, as illustrated by the EC – Seal Products case,111 the public morals 
justification under Article XX(a) GATT offers considerable room for interpretative 
maneuvering and de facto expanding the closed list of legitimate objectives under the GATT. 
But it seems difficult to do this for everything: for instance, how may the objective of 
‘ensuring the quality of exports’ listed in the preamble of the TBT Agreement be fitted into 
Article XX GATT?  
 
B. Unpacking Even-handedness: A Necessity Test? 
 
Even if uncertainty remains as to the scope of legitimacy under Article 2.1 TBT 
Agreement, the existence of a legitimate purpose is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for justifying a regulatory distinction causing detrimental impact. The Appellate Body’s 
even-handedness analysis under Article 2.1 TBT Agreement rightly suggests that we should 
further enquire into whether the regulatory distinction, and the resulting detrimental 
impact, is actually necessary to achieve such a legitimate purpose.112 Thus, in US – Tuna II, 
the difference in labelling conditions causing detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products 
could not be fully explained by the need to protect dolphins and inform consumers, since it 
was not commensurate with the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing methods 
employed in different areas of the ocean. Notably, products containing tuna caught outside 
the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) by fishing methods other than setting on dolphins 
(primarily of US and third-country origin) were eligible for the dolphin-safe label, without 
any certification as to whether dolphins had been killed or seriously injured during the 
course of the tuna fishing operations.113 Similarly, in US – COOL, the recordkeeping and 
verification requirements causing detrimental impact on imported livestock could not be 
explained by the need to provide information on origin to consumers, given that only a 
small amount of the information required to be tracked and transmitted by upstream 
producers was actually communicated to the consumers through the mandatory retail 
labels.114 In this sense, even-handedness could be seen as a proxy for a necessity test, even 
though the Appellate Body has not articulated it as such.  
                                                        
109 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, para 5.128. 
110 Appellate Body Report, US – COOL, above n 89, para. 445.  
111 For a discussion, see J. Möllenhoff, ‘Framing the ‘Public Morals’ Exception After EC – Seal Products 
With Insights from the ECtHR and the GATT National Security Exception’ CTEI Working Paper 2015-07, 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/ctei/shared/CTEI/working_papers/CTEI-
2015-07_Mollenhoff_EC-Seals-ECtHR.pdf.   
112 See Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Article 21.5), above n 27, paras 7.153 and 7.160 referring to an 
additional enquiry into whether the detrimental impact is explained as ‘proportionate’, or ‘commensurate’, in 
light of the objective pursued.    
113 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna (II), above n 23, paras 289-292; Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II 
(Article 21.5), above n 27, para 7.250. 
114 Appellate Body Report, US – COOL, above n 89, paras 347 and 349. 
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In reality, the Appellate Body has not provided much direction on the overall 
structure of the even-handedness analysis. It has just said that ‘[i]n assessing even-
handedness, a panel must carefully scrutinize the particular circumstances of the case, that 
is, the design, architecture, revealing structure, operation and application of the technical 
regulation at issue.’115 This merely indicates that deciding whether a measure pursues a 
given legitimate purpose in an even-handed manner involves a case-specific and highly 
fact-based inquiry into its design and application, with no facts being à priori excluded. 
While this approach is not per se wrong, it is too vague as to what even-handedness actually 
requires. To illustrate this point, let’s take the US – Tuna II dispute as an example.  
In this case, the main reason for the Appellate Body’s finding that the different 
labelling requirements were not even-handed in addressing risks to dolphins was that ‘[…] 
the US measure fully addresses the adverse effects on dolphins resulting from setting on 
dolphins in the ETP, whereas it does “not address mortality (observed or unobserved) 
arising from fishing methods other than setting on dolphins outside the ETP”’.116 The 
implication here seems to be that there were alternative measures reasonably available to 
the US that would achieve its dolphin protection/consumer information objectives in a less 
discriminatory manner –i.e., by doing something to sufficiently address similar adverse 
effects on dolphins outside the ETP. However, alternative measures were only superficially 
flagged at this stage of the dispute,117 and as a result it was left unresolved how exactly the 
US measure could be made even-handed and thus consistent with Article 2.1 TBT 
Agreement. In particular, it was unclear whether even-handedness would require the same 
certification requirements being applicable within and outside the ETP (i.e., mandatory 
independent observer certification), or conversely whether laxer certification requirements 
(i.e., captain self-certification) could still be applied outside the ETP in light of the 
prevailing risks to dolphins in this particular area of the ocean. 118  Similarly, it was 
undetermined whether other fishing methods pose a comparably high risk as setting on 
dolphins, and thus whether even-handedness would entail disqualifying tuna products 
caught by any such equally harmful method from accessing the dolphin-safe label.119 This 
uncertainty arising from the original proceedings has, inevitably, led to the appropriateness 
of alternative measures being contested at Panel compliance proceedings,120 and regrettably, 
the matter remains unsettled even after Appellate Body compliance proceedings.121 This is 
because the Appellate Body was unable to ‘complete the legal analysis’ and assess fully 
whether regulatory distinctions (other than the ‘determination provisions’) drawn under the 
amended US measure can be explained and justified in the light of the objective of 
protecting dolphin, ‘in the absence of a proper assessment by the Panel’ of the respective 
risks posed to dolphins inside and outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery. To be sure, it 
is not for the Appellate Body itself to undertake such a highly fact-intensive assessment,122 
but the Panel’s own failure to do so may be partly attributed to the vagueness of even-
handedness as an analytical tool, which has not been conducive to a prompt and effective 
settlement of the US – Tuna II dispute.123 
                                                        
115 Ibid, para 271; see also Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, above n 15, para 182.  
116 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II, above n 23, para 297 (emphasis in original).  
117 Ibid, para 296. 
118 Ibid, footnotes 612-613.  
119 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Article 21.5), above n 27, para 7.131. 
120 Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Article 2.1 5), above n 91, paras 7.120-7.135 and 7.180-7.263; and 7.264-7.283 
for separate opinion on the matter.  
121 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Article 21.5), above n 27, paras 7.229-7.230, 7.253 and 7.266.  
122 Article 17.6 of the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU) in World Trade Organization, above n 5, 354. 
123 Ibid, Article 3(3). 
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To remedy this shortcoming, it is submitted that the even-handedness analysis 
under Article 2.1 TBT Agreement should comprise a more in-depth consideration of 
whether a less discriminatory alternative measure exists that would be at least equally effective 
in reaching the legitimate goal pursed by the challenged measure –that is, a properly 
articulated necessity test. Doing so, would not only avoid the need for compliance 
proceedings in order to determine this very question, but also serve to provide a clearer 
analytical framework for WTO panels to conduct the factual examination under the LRD 
prong of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement. In addition, the approach suggested here would also 
have the advantage of delimiting the scope of enquiry under Article 2.1 TBT Agreement 
vis-à-vis Article 2.2 of the same agreement, the latter focusing instead on the availability of 
less trade-restrictive alternative measures that would contribute at least as much to achieving 
the pursued legitimate objective.124  Conversely, what matters under Article 2.1 TBT is 
whether a given legitimate purpose can be achieved in a less discriminatory manner, even if 
not necessarily in a less trade-restrictive one: notably, in US – Tuna II, even-handedness 
would appear to require an alternative measure that addresses similar adverse effects on 
dolphins outside the ETP, even though this may be more restrictive of trade in tuna 
products (i.e., from third countries other than Mexico) than the original US measure. 
Drawing such a line between Articles 2.1 and 2.2 TBT Agreement appears, in turn, the only 
possible way of dealing with a measure presenting a trade-off between its trade-restrictive 
and discriminatory effects, 125  which is typically the case of measures accommodating 
multiple competing purposes: for instance, in US – Clove Cigarettes, banning all flavoured 
cigarettes would have been a less discriminatory, yet more trade-restrictive, alternative 
measure available to the US in pursuing its objective of reducing youth smoking.  
 
V.  AVOIDING CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE GATT AND 
TBT JUSTIFICATION PROVISIONS 
 
The preceding analysis has revealed two main differences in the relevant provisions under 
the GATT and TBT Agreement for justifying discrimination/detrimental impact. The first 
partly stems from the text of these agreements, namely the closed list of legitimate 
objectives in Article XX GATT and the absence of such a list in Article 2.1 TBT 
Agreement leaving the scope of permissible justifications thereunder largely open. Yet 
arguably, this is not a primary concern given the Appellate Body hinted in EC – Seal 
Products that it will seek to avoid, as far as possible, any tension arising thereof through 
harmonious interpretation. The second results instead from the manner in which these 
justification provisions have been interpreted, and pertains to the rational connection 
standard on which the Appellate Body’s stance has been more ambivalent. As we have 
seen, under the LRD prong of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement the rationale for the regulatory 
distinction causing detrimental impact does not need to be rationally related to the main 
objective of the measure (as per US – Clove Cigarettes), whereas at least some degree of 
rational connection between the two appears to be required under the unjustifiable 
discrimination limb of Article XX GATT (even after EC – Seal Products). Indeed, this 
difference was the only ground for the complainants’ appeal in EC – Seal Products that the 
Panel had erred in applying the same legal test under both justification provisions.126 The 
Appellate Body did fault the Panel for directly importing its analysis under the LRD prong 
of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement into the chapeau of Article XX GATT, but only gave a 
cursory and formalistic explanation as to why the applicable legal tests are not the same.127 
                                                        
124 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II, above n 23, para 319-320. 
125 On this point, see further Bartels, above n 36, at 11-15. 
126 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 2, paras 2.39-2.40, 2.94-2.97 and 5.308. 
127 Ibid, paras 5.311-5.313. 
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If one compares the Panel’s reasoning and findings under the LDR prong of Article 2.1 
TBT Agreement with those of the Appellate Body under GATT Article XX-chapeau, the 
only material difference seems to be the relative weight attached to the rational connection 
standard.128 But the purpose here is not to further speculate on what the Appellate Body 
may have intended. Rather, it is to caution that, if the Appellate Body sticks to some 
rational connection requirement under the chapeau of Article XX GATT, we could end up 
with a troublesome result that the exact same discriminatory treatment of a measure 
pursuing multiple competing purposes is found to be TBT-consistent, and yet GATT-
inconsistent. 
This is not merely a theoretical possibility, but one that can be envisioned in 
practice by modifying the facts of the EC – Seal Products case. For the sake of the argument, 
let’s consider that: (i) the EU Seal Regulation had instead laid down a mandatory 
certification and labelling scheme that required seal products sold on the EU market to 
comply with certain humane hunting methods (assuming their application could be 
effectively monitored and enforced), 129 and hence was subject to the TBT disciplines;130 
while (ii) still provided an exception for seal products derived from hunts traditionally 
conducted by Inuit or other indigenous communities, but which was properly designed and 
applied (unlike in EC – Seal Products).131 In principle, this difference in regulatory treatment 
could be challenged under both Article I GATT and Article 2.1 TBT Agreement (i.e., MFN 
obligation), and would likely lead to a finding of detrimental impact on opportunities for 
imported non-Inuit seal products vis-à-vis imported Inuit seal products (assuming these are 
‘like products’, which was undisputed in EC – Seal Products).132 Applying some rational 
connection requirement under the chapeau of Article XX GATT would preclude this 
discrimination from being justified, given that its underlying rationale (i.e., protection of 
Inuit culture and subsistence) is unrelated to, and even goes against, the main objective of 
the measure (i.e., seal welfare protection). Conversely, under the LRD prong of Article 2.1 
TBT Agreement, nothing prevents the Inuit protection purpose from being accepted as an 
independent justifying rationale, and the detrimental impact caused by the Inuit/non-Inuit 
regulatory distinction could be justified if fully explained by the need to protect such Inuit 
interests.  
Now, how do we deal with this situation where the discriminatory impact of the IC 
exception is deemed justified under the LRD prong of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement but 
unjustified under GATT Article XX-chapeau? In principle, both agreements are cumulatively 
applicable, since the priority usually given to the TBT Agreement as a lex specialis in the 
order of analysis133 does not necessarily amount to excluding the applicability of the GATT 
as a lex generalis.134 In practice, the Appellate Body’s approach in the TBT trilogy cases 
                                                        
128 For further discussion, see Marín Durán, above n 100, at 19-20.  
129 This was, in fact, the less trade-restrictive alternative measure advanced by the complainants in EC – Seal 
Products (2014): see above n 68 and accompanying test.  
130 For present purposes, it is assumed that a certification and labelling scheme prescribing seal hunting 
techniques qualifies as a technical regulation and falls under the scope of application of the TBT Agreement. 
In reality, it remains open to question which processes and production methods are covered by Annex 1 TBT 
Agreement: see further, Gracia Marín Durán, above n 7.   
131 See above section III.B, for a discussion of the discriminatory defects in the design and application of the 
IC exception under the original EU seal regime.  
132 See above n 29.  
133 See WTO Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
WT/DS135/R, adopted (as modified) 5 April 2001, para 8.16; see also WTO Panel Report, European 
Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/R, adopted (as modified) 23 October 2002, paras 7.14-
7.19. 
134 See Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Cross-agreement Complaints before the Appellate Body: a case study of the EC – 
Asbestos dispute’ (2002) 1(1) World Trade Review 63, at 82; see also UN General Assembly, Fragmentation of 
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appears to imply that a measure found to be inconsistent with Article 2.1 TBT Agreement 
may not need further examination under the GATT, whereas a measure consistent with 
that TBT provision (as in our hypothetical case) does require such further examination.135 
The only exception to such a cumulative application is, pursuant to the General 
Interpretative Note to Annex 1A, where it results in a ‘conflict’ between a provision of the 
GATT and a provision of the TBT Agreement, and in this case the latter ‘shall prevail to 
the extent of the conflict’. 136 However, it is not obvious that our hypothetical example 
would constitute a ‘conflict’ so as to be captured by the General Interpretative Note.  
The term ‘conflict’ is not defined in the General Interpretative Note, and is yet to 
be clarified by the Appellate Body in that specific context. It is largely undisputed that a 
conflict between WTO covered agreements exists in situations of mutually exclusive 
obligations that cannot be complied with simultaneously –i.e., whereby a GATT provision 
requires what a provision in another agreement in Annex 1A prohibits, or vice versa. But it is 
unsettled whether the notion of conflict should be strictly limited to this direct 
incompatibility between obligations in the GATT and in other Annex 1A agreements. Such 
a strict definition was, for instance, applied by the Panel in Indonesia – Autos in the 
framework of the relationship between the GATT and the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 137  (included in Annex 1A). 138  However, as Pauwelyn rightly 
criticizes, following this narrow definition of conflict would implicate that the WTO 
‘systematically elevates the obligations of WTO members over and above [their] rights’.139 
This is because there could never be a conflict between a prescriptive GATT provision 
imposing an obligation (e.g., not to discriminate between like products) and a permissive 
provision in another Annex 1A agreement granting a right (e.g., an authorization or 
justification for discrimination): the former GATT provision will simply prevail, 
irrespective of the General Interpretative Note. To put it differently, it will always be 
possible for a WTO member to adhere to both provisions by renouncing its right.140 This 
restrictive interpretation of conflict cannot be correct, as Bartels points out, in light of 
Articles 3.2 and 19.2 DSU, which equally protect the rights and obligations of WTO 
members under the covered agreements.141 
A more appropriate stance was taken by the Panel in EC – Bananas III, which 
interpreted the notion of conflict in the General Interpretative Note more broadly, 
encompassing not only clashes between mutually exclusive obligations but also situations 
‘where a rule in one agreement prohibits what a rule in another agreement explicitly 
                                                                                                                                                                  
International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law – Report 
of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.702, dated 18 July 2006, at 9.  
135 See in particular, Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II, above n 23, paras 405-406; and Marceau, above n 
102, at 33-34 for a discussion.  
136 General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A in World Trade Organization, above n 5, 16; WTO Appellate 
Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, at 12-14.   
137 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) in World Trade Organization, 
above n 5, 231. 
138  WTO Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, 
WT/DS54/DS55/DS59/DS64/R, adopted 23 July 1998, paras 14.97-14.99; see also WTO Appellate Body 
Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60/AB/R, 
adopted 25 November 1998, para 65, adopting also a narrow definition of conflict in relation to the DSU and 
the special rules on dispute settlement contained in other WTO covered agreements. In support of this 
approach, see Elisabetta Montagui and Maurits Lugard, ‘The GATT 1994 and other Annex 1A Agreements: 
Four Different Relationships?’ (2000) 3(3) Journal of International Economic Law 473, at 476.  
139 Pauwelyn, above n 134, at 80.  
140 See WTO Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC 
– Bananas III), WT/DS27/R, adopted (as modified) 25 September 1997, para 7.159, footnote 403. 
141 Lorand Bartels, ‘Overlaps and Conflicts Between the WTO Agriculture Agreement and the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’ (2016) 50 Journal of World Trade 7, at 10-11. 
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permits.’ 142  Under this approach, WTO rights are not always subordinated to WTO 
obligations: a GATT provision forbidding a certain conduct can be superseded, for 
instance, by a TBT provision allowing that same conduct. In US – Upland Cotton, the 
Appellate Body seemed to endorse this broader definition of conflict in relation to Article 
21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, which regulates its relationship with the GATT and 
Annex 1A agreements. It held that this provision could apply in three situations, including: 
‘[…] where there is an explicit authorization in the text of the [Agreement on Agriculture] 
that would authorize a measure that, in the absence of such an express authorization, 
would be prohibited by Article 3.1(b) of the [SCM Agreement].’143 Therefore, the Appellate 
Body’s reasoning could suggest that an explicit authorization (or right) in an Annex 1A 
Agreement could prevail over a contrary obligation (or prohibition) in the GATT.144 
But even if this broader definition is adopted in the context of the General 
Interpretative Note, it is still questionable there would be a conflict in our hypothetical 
example: that is, between the lack of justification for the discriminatory impact of the IC 
exception under the chapeau of Article XX GATT and its possible justification under the 
LRD limb of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement. In this case, we are neither dealing with a 
conflict between obligations, nor between an obligation and a right, 145  but rather a 
contradiction between rights (or authorizations): that is, between the set of provisions that 
allow WTO members to justify discrimination under the GATT and the TBT Agreement. 
Arguably, nothing in the text of the General Interpretative Note prevents it from being 
applicable to a conflict between rights, given that it just refers to ‘provisions’ in general (not 
obligations, nor rights).146 Even so, the contradiction between justification provisions is not 
explicit in the text –as both agreements use the identical language of ‘arbitrary and 
unjustifiable discrimination’.147 It rather stems from the interpretation of these provisions 
by the Appellate Body as involving different legal standards for determining whether 
discrimination is justified. Arguably, this should not be an obstacle as nothing in the 
General Interpretative Note confines its application to textual conflicts between 
provisions, and not the manner in which these have been interpreted and applied.  
And yet, applying the General Interpretative Note to our hypothetical TBT-
justified/GATT-unjustified tension through a broad definition of conflict would create 
another hurdle. That is, recognizing a conflict exists between the justification provisions of 
the GATT and the TBT Agreement risks increasing strategic litigation: if the complaining 
party perceives it may be easier for the defendant to justify the discriminatory effect of a 
measure under the TBT Agreement, it would logically just bring discrimination claims 
under the GATT and avoid parallel TBT claims altogether. Moreover, this interpretative 
approach would be at odds with the Appellate Body’s own proposition in EC – Asbestos 
that the TBT Agreement is intended to ‘further the objectives of the GATT’ by imposing 
                                                        
142 Panel Report, EC – Bananas III, above n 140, paras 7.159 and 7.161. In support of this broader definition 
of conflict, see Pauwelyn, above n 134, at 78.  
143 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted 21 
March 2005, para 532. Thus, it seems unlikely that the Appellate Body would accept an implicit authorization 
(or right) in an Annex 1A agreement to take precedence over a contrary obligation in the GATT.  
144 See also Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, paras 155-157, where it took a similar approach 
when examining the relationship between Article XIII GATT and Articles 4 and 21.1 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  
145  The discrimination obligations in Articles I/III GATT and Article 2.1 TBT (minus LRD prong) are 
essentially the same: see above section II. 
146On this point, see European Union, ‘Third Participant Oral Statement in US – COOL (Article 21.5)’, dated 
16 February 2015, in particular paras. 8-14. 
147  This similarity between the language of GATT Article XX-chapeau and the Preamble of the TBT 
Agreement (sixth recital), which served as context for introducing the LRD prong into Article 2.1 TBT 
Agreement, was noted in Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Article 21.5), above n 27, para 7.88.  
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‘additional’ obligations upon WTO members.148 However, the alternative of excluding the 
application of General Interpretative Note by adopting a strict definition of conflict would 
be equally absurd. In this case, both agreements would apply cumulatively and the 
inconsistency with GATT Article XX-chapeau given effect, which would also be odd given 
the exact same discriminatory treatment is justifiable under the LRD limb of Article 2.1 
TBT Agreement. In sum, either way of dealing with the TBT-justified/GATT-unjustified 
tension would lead to a problematic outcome. This is a good reason for avoiding 
conflicting interpretations and aligning the legal standards for justifying discrimination 




As we have seen, measures purportedly balancing multiple competing purposes by means 
of a rule/exception pose a singular challenge from a WTO law perspective. Such measures 
may not only come into tension with core WTO non-discrimination disciplines (i.e., 
Articles I and III GATT, as well as Article 2.1 TBT Agreement minus the LRD prong) but, 
as Levy and Regan aptly note, ‘as the regulatory regime responds to more and more 
purposes, the opportunities for covert protectionism, or for favouritism between trading 
partners, increase, so we should look for such covert purposeful discrimination with special 
care.’149 However, this article has argued that such a concern is not sensibly addressed by 
pronouncing a dictum that discrimination can never be justified by reasons other than the 
principal objective of the measure. This rational connection requirement formulated by the 
Appellate Body in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres is over-simplistic and excessively restrictive of 
domestic regulatory autonomy, since discrimination caused by an exception would be ipso 
facto censured only because its rationale is different from, and may go against, the main 
objective of the measure. And yet, this rational disconnect is not, in and of itself, evidence 
that the exception is motivated by an improper policy purpose: it may well be or it may not. 
Accordingly, it is suggested that a more appropriate legal test for justifying 
discrimination/detrimental impact under WTO law should comprise a two-step enquiry 
into:  
 
(i) Whether there is a genuinely legitimate rationale for the discrimination, even if 
disconnected from, or in contradiction with, the main objective of the measure, and 
if so;  
(ii) Whether the discriminatory impact is fully explained by, or necessary to achieve, that 
legitimate purpose –i.e., in other words, there is no less discriminatory alternative 
measure reasonably available to this end.  
 
From this standpoint, a second argument made here is that the Appellate Body’s decision 
in EC – Seal Products was disappointing for a number of reasons. With respect to the first 
prong of the above justification test, the Appellate Body ambivalently relaxed the rational 
connection requirement under the chapeau of Article XX GATT, but it never went as far 
as accepting that discrimination can be justified by a legitimate policy purpose, even if it is 
unrelated or goes against the main objective of the measure. It could well be that the 
Appellate Body implicitly accepted the Inuit protection purpose as an independent 
rationale for justifying discrimination, but it did so without reference to any normative 
considerations. As a result, it has left great uncertainty as to the normative basis for 
identifying legitimate justifications under the chapeau of Article XX GATT in future cases. 
                                                        
148  WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, para 80. 
149 Levy and Regan, above n 16, at 363. 
 24 
With regard to the second prong of the proposed justification test, the Appellate Body was 
right to condemn the discriminatory manner in which the IC was designed and applied, as 
this was evidently not necessary to protect Inuit cultural identity and subsistence. But even 
after these defects have been corrected, the revised IC exception will continue to have a 
detrimental impact on Canadian/Norwegian non-Inuit commercial seal products (i.e., still 
banned from the EU market) vis-à-vis Greenlandic Inuit subsistence seal products (i.e., 
permitted into the EU market). Therefore, it would have been desirable for the Appellate 
Body to address whether this discrimination was necessary to protect such Inuit interests, 
and thus justifiable under GATT Article XX-chapeau.  
 Had the Appellate Body followed the approach suggested here, it would have 
brought the unjustifiable discrimination test under the chapeau of Article XX GATT in 
closer alignment with its reasoning under the LRD prong of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement –
even though, uncertainty also remains under this latter provision as to both the scope of 
legitimacy and what even-handedness actually requires. Indeed, a third argument advanced 
in this article is that there are good systemic reasons for the GATT and TBT justification 
provisions not to substantively differ with regard to the rational connection standard.150 In 
both instances, the relationship between the detrimental impact and the main objective of 
the measure can be a relevant factor in the justification analysis, and particularly so when 
the defending WTO member has offered no other legitimate explanation for the 
discrimination. 151  But under none of these provisions should rational connection be 
construed as a strict requirement or condition that would preclude a defending WTO 
member from justifying detrimental impact on the basis of a genuinely legitimate rationale 
that is unrelated the measure’s main objective. Regrettably, the Appellate Body’s stance on 
this critical point remains ambiguous, as most recently illustrated in US – Tuna II (Article 
21.5) by its sweeping statements on rational connection being ‘one of the most important 
factors’ under GATT Article XX-chapeau while ‘potentially helpful’ under the LRD limb 
of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement. 152  And yet, clinging to some rational connection 
requirement under the chapeau of Article XX GATT while not under the LRD prong of 
Article 2.1 TBT Agreement, could lead us to the absurd outcome that the exact same 
discriminatory treatment of a measure pursuing multiple competing objectives is found to 
be TBT-justified, and yet GATT-unjustified. As we have seen, it is unclear whether the 
conflict rule in the General Interpretative Note would be applicable to this situation, but 
even if it was, it would not offer a fully satisfactory solution. Accordingly, the preferred 
way forward in avoiding an irrational TBT-justified/GATT-unjustified scenario is through 
consistent interpretation of the relevant justification provisions along the two-step test 
suggested above. 
 
                                                        
150 Other than for the formal difference in terms of the burden of proof under Article 2.1 TBT Agreement 
(imposing an obligation) and Article XX GATT (establishing an exception): see Appellate Body Report, US – 
Tuna II (Article 21.5), above n 27, para 7.89.  
151 See e.g., ibid, para 7.98, where the only explanation provided by the US for the differences in labelling 
conditions, and the resulting detrimental impact, was based on the dolphin protection objective of the 
measure (i.e., the allegedly different risks to dolphins associated with tuna fishing in different areas of the 
oceans and using different fishing methods).  
152 Ibid, paras 7.92-7.93, 7.95, 7.99 and 7.153. 
